

Caught between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Some Problems with Dutch Neutrality in the Great War, 1914 – 1918

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Historians of neutrality have generally viewed the Great War as the event that witnessed the demise, or, in the words of the historian Nils Örvik, “the decline” of neutrality as an attractive and worthwhile foreign policy option for small states, especially small European states.¹ For the Netherlands, a little country surrounded by several warring great powers between 1914 and 1918, this assertion proves to be all too correct. In 1914, neutrality was an exceedingly appealing option for the Dutch: they hoped it would protect their independence within Europe, guarantee them a degree of economic freedom to trade, maintain links with their South-East Asian colonies (principally the Dutch East Indies, present day Indonesia), and protect their hallowed identity as upholders of international law and peace.² By the time of the signing of the armistice agreement in November 1918, however, all of these aims had been violated in some way. What the Netherlands did manage to do was refrain from becoming a belligerent, in itself an achievement given that many other European neutrals could not: most famously, Germany invaded neutral Belgium in August 1914. Italy and Romania decided to join the Allied war effort in May 1915 and August 1916 respectively because the potential gains of victory were too good to pass. With similar justifications, but from the other side, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915.³

Why was the Netherlands fortunate to remain out of the war? Traditionally, historians have looked at the relationship between the Dutch and their neighbours to answer this question.⁴ Few would question that if either Germany or Great Britain had the desire, they could easily have invaded and captured Dutch territory. While the Dutch conscript army was not inconsiderable in size - nearly 200,000 men mobilised in early August 1914 -⁵ it could not combat a serious invasion attempt. Although the neutral was certainly better prepared for war in 1914 than it had been during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 – 1871, and even though it was better placed to face an invasion in 1914 than it would be during the German invasion of May 1940,⁶ there were distinct concerns surrounding the defensive capabilities of the armed forces at the start of the Great War. First, and perhaps foremost, the four Field Army divisions mobilised across the country facing the eastern, southern and western borders; a situation, as we shall see, was forced upon them by the requirement to protect against possible neutrality violations wherever they may occur, and regardless of the actuality of such a threat. Without concentrated might, of course, the ability to withstand an invasion decreased significantly.⁷ Defence was further weakened by a lack of mobile and heavy artillery as well as by ammunition shortages.⁸ The two rings of fortifications in the heart of the country, the New Holland Waterline and fortified position of Amsterdam, were also in need of strengthening and modern artillery support.⁹ The Netherlands’ only real defence hope lay in the ability to use the New Holland Waterline to inundate the countryside and thereby halt any advance from the east. But inundation took several days. In ideal conditions, the Dutch may have held

out against a concerted attack by a larger and stronger armed force in the short-term, but had little chance of doing so if the attack was protracted, involved heavy artillery (like that employed by Germany in the siege of Belgian fortifications in 1914), or was carried out before inundation was possible.

Of course, any prospective invader had more than only Dutch military strength to consider. It also had to take into account the situation of its other potential enemies. In August 1914, Germany did not wish to route its armies through the Netherlands, even though the original Schlieffen Plan had envisaged passage across the province of Limburg.¹⁰ The German General Helmuth von Moltke made decisive alterations to the Schlieffen Plan between 1908 and 1911, which included the decision to respect Dutch territory in a future conflict with France, instead moving troops solely through Belgium and Luxembourg.¹¹ Three interrelated reasons lay at the heart of von Moltke's decision: firstly, the route through the Netherlands would delay the advance into France, which was, after all, the purpose of the whole exercise. The German High Command recognised that conquering the Netherlands was entirely achievable, but that it would take time and divert too many soldiers away from the principle aim. Secondly, keeping the Netherlands neutral would ensure that Britain and France could not use the Schelde (Scheldt) river to support the Belgian city of Antwerp, since the mouth of the river was in Dutch territory.¹² The Schelde was, arguably, one of the most prized possessions of Dutch neutrality; highly desired by both warring sides for its geo-strategic position since it provided an outlet to the Channel from Belgium as well as a easily navigated route into Antwerp. In fact, one historian went so far as to proclaim that during the Great War both sets of belligerents believed that whichever power controlled the river could control the outcome of the war.¹³ Keeping the river out of enemy hands was a powerful motivating force for each warring side. The third, and perhaps most important, reason for respecting Dutch neutrality was that Germany hoped to use the Netherlands to evade any wartime blockade of its ports.¹⁴ Although many contemporaries believed in the decade leading up to the outbreak of war that any future conflict would be short and decisive, there were enough realists in the German High Command, including von Moltke, who foresaw that a military encounter involving both France and Russia had the potential to be a drawn-out affair.¹⁵ As a result, von Moltke's statement that the neutral Netherlands was to be the economic "windpipe" through which Germany would "breathe" was entirely significant.¹⁶

While Germany had, therefore, good reason to refrain from interfering with the territorial sovereignty of the Netherlands in 1914, the Allies, and especially Great Britain, had more than ample reason to seek Dutch involvement in the war at this stage. The Allies would have obtained immense advantage from being able to use the Schelde to supply troops and materials to Antwerp. Likewise, the potential use of Dutch ports as a blockade breaker by Germany was very clear in their minds. As a report of the British Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) concluded in December 1912:

In order to bring the greatest possible pressure to bear upon Germany, it is essential that the Netherlands ... should either be entirely friendly to this country [Great Britain], in which case we should limit their overseas trade, or that they should be definitely hostile, in which case we should extend the blockade to their ports.¹⁷

Rotterdam was, of course, already a major trading haven for Germany, ranking second only to Hamburg itself.¹⁸ Nevertheless, despite the attractions of forcing the

Dutch to enter the war, there were two overarching reasons why the Allies could not violate Dutch neutrality. Having ostensibly entered the war to protect the rights and privileges of neutral Belgium, Britain could not then be seen breaching the same sovereign rights and privileges of the neutral Netherlands.¹⁹ Secondly, Germany would not have allowed Allied capture of the Dutch nation, and the Allies knew this, the principle reason why Britain did not seriously consider this option until very late in the conflict (September 1918), at which time Germany could no longer prevent any Allied military activity there.²⁰ At any rate, during the opening months of war, the Allies were in no position to defend or attack more territory while they were losing ground to the Germans in Belgium and France.

After the deadlock on the Western Front developed late in 1914, Germany should have had fewer qualms about violating the borders of the Netherlands. The strategic reasons for avoiding Dutch territory in August had disappeared, since France was not defeated. Of course, the German armed forces were themselves now stretched in their commitments on several fronts in the east and west, accounting for at least part of the reason why they continued to respect the Netherlands' sovereignty. Above all, however, the Dutch proved to be essential sources of goods, both smuggled and legally traded.²¹ In fact, economic historians have argued that the Dutch economy thrived in 1915 and 1916 because of the unending demand for produce and goods in Germany.²² Until the summer of 1916, the Netherlands was the most important foreign supplier of foodstuffs to Germany: Dutch exports of cheese, butter, eggs, potatoes and meat, for example, tripled between 1913 and 1915. According to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, one of the principal reasons why Germany could keep fighting on two fronts during the first two years of war came down to this trade.²³ Of course, Dutch territory provided useful flank cover in case of an amphibious assault from the west as well.²⁴ In other words, the neutral neighbour was an extremely useful neighbour for Germany.

It would seem, therefore, that the balance of interests of each warring side kept the Netherlands neutral during the Great War. Such a statement – namely that Dutch neutrality relied on the wishes of the great powers – nevertheless, threatens to neglect the precarious situation of the country during the war, as well as the immense pressure it faced to compromise with the belligerents. Neutrality did not stop the Central or Allied powers from exacting as many concessions and advantages out of Dutch non-belligerency as possible, so much so, that the rights, privileges and obligations imposed on neutrals by international law were violated and largely made redundant by the actions of the warring states. Especially in 1917 and 1918, after the United States entered the war, the Netherlands had to negotiate its independence, its economic well-being, and its military security. Its sole aim became the prevention of an invasion, at whatever cost.

The costs of the Great War for the Netherlands were high. While many contemporaries saw neutrals as ruthlessly profiteering from the war, neutrality proved not to be the hoped for cash cow ready to be milked at will. The Netherlands did profit handsomely from the first few war years, while it still had trade links with its colonies, could obtain materials from abroad, and had stockpiled goods at hand. Its trade and credit arrangements with Germany were especially lucrative, as were the profits made by professional smugglers.²⁵ However, the Allies quite naturally saw any advantage obtained from Dutch neutrality by the Germans as a threat to their war effort. The blockade could not work if Germany avoided its consequences by obtaining materials from its neutral neighbours, including Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and the Netherlands. As a result, and rather quickly, Great

Britain and France extended the provisions of the blockade and interfered in the trade and shipping rights of these neutral states. They ensured that by late 1916, the Netherlands was receiving only a fraction of pre-war supplies, a situation hindered further by shipping losses due to the war at sea.²⁶ The Allies also pressured the Netherlands and its neutral colleagues into a series of stifling agricultural agreements, further limiting their export options to the Central Powers.²⁷ Furthermore, private trading institutions such as the Netherlands' Overseas Trust worked closely with the Allies to ensure the blockade restrictions were upheld.²⁸ As a result, by 1917, Germany had lost most of the economic advantages attached to the neutrality of the Dutch state. For the Netherlands, it meant that Germany would be less willing to co-operate in the future.

With the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, the Netherlands' uncertain position heightened further. It had relied on American imports, especially grain and artificial fertilizers, to improve its own agricultural output and feed its population, as well as to create a surplus to sell to Germany, thereby keeping its powerful neighbour on side.²⁹ The Dutch, like so many peoples in industrial nations, were not self-sufficient. As a belligerent, the United States not only suspended much of its trade with neutrals, but also imposed strict blockade rules in line with Britain and France.³⁰ Throughout 1917 and 1918, all three associated powers placed greater pressure on the Dutch, and other nations bordering Germany, to abstain from trading with their enemy.³¹ Since the Dutch relied on imports of coal and other industrial materials from Germany - the Dutch were also not industrially self-sufficient - they really were stuck between a rock and a hard place, between the devil and the deep blue sea,³² since Germany would not sell them coal without receiving food in return. Eventually, the compromises reached between the two sides, ensured that Dutch exporters lost almost all say in how much they could trade, with whom, and even at what price.

It is in terms of military security, above all, that the precarious situation of the neutral Netherlands during the Great War is best illustrated. As mentioned above, the 200,000 conscripts and officers mobilised in the Dutch armed forces on 1 August 1914, prepared, however inadequately, for an invasion. Unlike their counterparts in warring states, however, the Dutch military had a dual responsibility: to defend the nation under attack, and, if an invasion failed to eventuate, to protect and uphold the nation's neutrality.³³ When Germany subsequently invaded Belgium and Luxembourg on 3 August 1914, the Dutch breathed a huge sigh of relief. The maintenance of neutrality now became the primary responsibility and focus for the army, navy and fledgling air force.

As a result, soldiers spent most of the war years preventing the misuse of Dutch territory according to the obligations laid down in international law. Hence, troops patrolled the borders on the look-out for foreign military personnel crossing into the country, most of whom were interned in camps as was their equipment and horses (in total about 45,000 German, Belgian and British troops as well as a handful of French and American pilots spent their war years in Dutch internment facilities).³⁴ Troops also checked all cargo leaving and entering the country at the borders and naval ships patrolled harbours inspecting all merchant vessels, to ensure no military contraband was traded, under the obligation that belligerents may not use neutral countries for military gain.³⁵ In fact, policing and preventing illegal trade, in the form of smuggling, also became one of the most time-consuming tasks fulfilled by the military.³⁶ To this end, the government forced a "state of emergency" (*staat van beleg* or "state of siege") on almost three-quarters of the nation by late 1917, to give the

armed forces extraordinary powers to deal with smugglers.³⁷ The “state of siege” jurisdiction helped commanders curb “un-neutral” press publications as well, and to dabble in local affairs with the aim of improving on and protecting neutrality.

By 1917, upholding neutrality requirements became so time-consuming and comprehensive that the responsibility to maintain an adequate level of defence suffered. Meeting defence needs involved not only mobilising one’s available resources in the direction most likely to be at threat, but also to improve and keep one’s armed forces as strong and well-supplied as possible. The irony behind the requirements – organising in terms of the most likely threat and improving the technological and material base of the military – was that they were seriously undermined by continued neutrality. The nature of neutrality relied heavily upon the perceptions of outsiders. To be classed as truly neutral, therefore, the army had no choice but to mobilise in every direction from which an intrusion could potentially occur. No apparent bias in military measures should be discernable, in case one or other belligerent perceived it as favouring their enemy. In other words, what was most obvious in defence terms, namely to concentrate on a possible invasion from Germany or around the Schelde river mouth (a coveted asset for both the Allied and Central Powers), was simply not possible.³⁸

Likewise, the war prevented the Dutch from keeping up with the technological advances made in the belligerent armies. If they had joined one or other side, they could have obtained the necessary expertise, equipment and supplies to augment and maintain at least a nominal level of parity. As a neutral, isolated from the war fronts and from the industrial capacities of the warring states, this support was entirely lacking. In other words, the obligation to stay neutral undermined the ability of the armed forces to fulfil their traditional role of defence. Of course, if the belligerents continued to respect the neutrality of the Netherlands, the military would not need to use its defensive capabilities at all. But, given that the value of a nation’s neutrality decreases as the strength of its military power weakens, the decline of military readiness ensured that the Dutch had to rely increasingly on their neighbours’ support of neutrality, rather than on their own ability to protect their borders. This situation became all the more apparent in the final two years of war, and signalled above all, that by November 1918, the security of the Netherlands existed on entirely shaky ground.

How dangerous the situation actually became for the Netherlands during the war, is highlighted best by a series of crises affecting the country between March and May 1918. On 20 and 21 March 1918, the United States and Great Britain requisitioned all Dutch ships anchored in their ports, using a rarely used legal principle of *angary* (the right of a state in crisis to take over the property of other countries if the needs of war require it).³⁹ The requisitioning came after months of tense communications, during which the Allies demanded that the Dutch release a merchant vessel for Allied use (with the purpose of transporting Allied trade, military materials or troops) for every ship with raw materials leaving their ports to the Netherlands. Bound by neutrality obligations that Germany would not have let them breach, the Dutch had no option but to repeatedly deny the request. The Allies thus forced the situation by requisitioning the ships, an act which certainly made the Germans furious. As a result, the German leadership threatened to declare war on the Dutch, if they did not give similar concessions in turn, including the right to transit military goods across neutral territory.⁴⁰ The Dutch, fully realising the need to concede something to Germany, could do little more than negotiate an appropriate settlement, even if it came at the cost of its own independence and strict neutrality. In

the end, the Allies agreed to grant Germany the right to transit as much sand and gravel, used to build concrete pillboxes on the Western Front, through the Netherlands.⁴¹ At this stage of the war, with Germany launching the opening moves of a huge offensive in Belgium and France, the Allies could not risk a German invasion of the Netherlands as well. They did not have the soldiers or resources to divert elsewhere. The Dutch themselves could only breathe another huge sigh of relief.

The Netherlands managed to stay out of the Great War. It did so thanks in large part to the fact that both sets of belligerents had too much at stake to let their enemies take control over the country. The Great War, however, changed the viability of Dutch neutrality significantly, so much so, that the hopes and desires attached to neutrality in 1914 had disappeared in 1918 and the strength of that neutrality had also taken a severe dive. The war years illustrated above all that neutrality failed to live up to its promise as a valuable foreign affairs policy, and should have served as a warning that in a world where military might and industrial capacity were so closely connected, a small industrially weak nation like the Netherlands would never be able to protect its independence and sovereignty, however hard it may try, without credible support from elsewhere. Neutrality could not be the answer, but the options for the Netherlands in the future in a far from stable continent looked far from rosy.

¹ Nils Örvik. *The Decline of Neutrality 1914 - 1941. With special reference to the United States and the Northern Neutrals*. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953.

² This paper is broadly based upon themes in: Maartje Abbenhuis. "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: The Netherlands, Neutrality and the Military in the Great War, 1914 – 1918." Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Canterbury, 2001.

³ Roger MacGinty. "War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World War." *European History Quarterly* 27:1 (January 1997): 45. Herman Kinder, Hilgemann Werner. *The Penguin Atlas of World History. Volume II: From the French Revolution to the Present*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1995. p. 123.

⁴ See, for example: C. Smit. *Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899 - 1919)*. Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1971 – 73. Marc Frey. *Der Erste Weltkrieg und die Niederlande. Ein neutrales Land im politischen und militärischen Kalkül der Kriegsgegner*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998. Marc Frey. "Bullying the Neutrals: The Case of the Netherlands." in: Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, eds. *Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914 - 1918*. Cambridge and Washington D.C.: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 227 - 244. Th. Oostendorp. "Duitsland en de Nederlandse neutraliteit 1914 – 1918." *Militaire Spectator* 134 (1965): 229 - 233. Diana Faye Sanders. "The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning, August 1914 - November 1918." Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1975. p. 261. Charles Albert Watson. "Britain's Dutch Policy, 1914 - 1918, the View from the British Archives." Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University Graduate School, 1969. p. 213. James John Porter. "Dutch Neutrality in Two World Wars." Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1980. Amry Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands During the World War*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1927.

⁵ F. Snapper. "Enige Sterktecijfers Betreffende de Nederlandse Landmacht in de Periode 1840 - 1940." *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis* 4 (1981): 87.

⁶ F. Snapper. "De gevechtswaarde van de Nederlandse landmacht in de periode 1914 - 1918 en in 1940." *Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis* 3 (1980): 16 - 54. W. Klinkert, J. W. M. Schulten, Luc De Vos, eds. *Mobilisatie in Nederland en België: 1870-1914-1939*. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991. C. M. Schulten. "Van neutralisme naar bondgenootschap de mobilisaties in 1870, 1914 en 1939." in: C. A. Kuyt, ed. *Nederland mobiliseert*. The Hague: Maatschappij Stichting Krijgsmacht, 1985. pp. 3 - 16. C. M. Schoenmaker. "Clio at arms: military history in the Netherlands." *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis* 14 (1991): pp. 82 - 104.

⁷ Maartje Abbenhuis. "Rustig te midden van woedende golven. De moeilijke verdediging van de Nederlandse neutraliteit." in: Hans Andriessen, Martin Ros, Perry Pierik, eds. *De Grote Oorlog. Kroniek 1914 - 1918. Essays over de Eerste Wereldoorlog*. Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2002. pp. 306 - 307. Norbert-Jan Nuij arrived at a similar conclusion: "Die alles dekt, slecht bewaart." De invloed van het

strategisch denken in Nederland op de relatieve gevechtswaarde van de krijgsmacht 1908 - 1918.” in: Andriessen et. al., eds. *De Grote Oorlog*. pp. 211 - 213.

⁸ Hubert van Tuyll van Serooskerken. *The Netherlands and World War I. Espionage, Diplomacy and Survival*. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001. p. 105. N. Bosboom. *In Moeilijke Omstandigheden. Augustus 1914 - Mei 1917*. Gorinchem: J. Noorduyt & Zoon, 1933. pp. 33 - 34. See also: Abbenhuis. “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.” Chapter 9, pp. 298 - 334.

⁹ G. A. A. Alting von Geusau. *Onze Weermacht te Land*. Amsterdam: Ipenbuur & van Seldam, 1913. p. 28.

¹⁰ Captain “Candid” of the Netherlands Army. *An Episode of the Great War. The Limburg Manoeuvre of August 1914. A Study of the Strategic Position of Dutch-Limburg*. Utrecht: Bruna, 1919. p. 12. Tuyll van Serooskerken. *The Netherlands and World War I*. p. 27.

¹¹ J. A. Fortuin. “Nederland en het Schlieffenplan. Een onderzoek naar de positie van Nederland in het Duitse aanvalsplan voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog.” *Militaire Spectator* 149 (1980): 21 - 35.

¹² By international law, neutral territory may not be used by belligerents for the transport or movement of military equipment or troops, let alone for the conduct of military operations, see: Articles 1 and 2 of the Netherlands’ neutrality declaration, 5 August 1914, in: Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. Appendix I, p. 318. “1907 Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land” and “1907 Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War” in: Adam Roberts, Richard Guelff, eds. *Documents on the Laws of War. Second Edition*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. pp. 63 - 68, 110 - 116.

¹³ Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. p. 39.

¹⁴ There is some debate on whether von Moltke had economic or strategic considerations in mind most when he altered the Schlieffen Plan to avoid the Netherlands. See: Fortuin. “Nederland en het Schlieffenplan.” p. 32. Baer. “The Anglo-German antagonism.” p. 129. Tuyll van Serooskerken. *The Netherlands and World War I*. pp. 24 - 28.

¹⁵ Holger H. Herwig. “Germany and the ‘short-war’ illusion: Toward a new interpretation?” *The Journal of Military History* 66:3 (July 2002): 681 - 693.

¹⁶ Helmuth von Moltke, as quoted in: C. M. Schulten. “The Netherlands and its Army (1900 - 1940).” *Militaire Spectator* 149 (1980): 78.

¹⁷ As quoted in: Naill Ferguson. *The Pity of War*. London: Allen Lane, 1998. p. 67. See also: Marc Frey. “Trade, Ships and the Neutrality of the Netherlands in the First World War.” *International History Review* 19: 3 (August 1997): 543. Frey. “Bullying the Neutrals.” p. 229.

¹⁸ Frey. “Bullying the neutrals.” p. 228.

¹⁹ Baer. “The Anglo-German antagonism.” p. 84.

²⁰ Sanders. “The Netherlands in British Strategic Planning.” p. 261. Watson. “Britain’s Dutch Policy.” p. 213.

²¹ Frey. “Bullying the Neutrals.” p. 233.

²² Jan L. van Zanden. *The Economic History of the Netherlands 1914 - 1995. A small open economy in the ‘long’ twentieth century*. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. pp. 93 - 94.

²³ Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg, in: Frey. “Trade, Ships, and the Neutrality of the Netherlands.” p. 547.

²⁴ F. de Bas. *Waakzaam en Weerbaar*. Schiedam: H. A. M. Roelants, 1918. p. 30. Koen Koch. “Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Of het geluk van de onverdiende voorspoed.” in: André W. M. Gerrits, Jaap H. de Wilde, eds. *Aan het slagveld ontsnapt: over oorlogen die niet plaatsvonden. Een Liber Amicorum voor Hylke Tromp*. Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000. p. 105.

²⁵ Frey. “Bullying the neutrals.” p. 233.

²⁶ G. Vissering, J. Westerman Holstijn. “The Effect of the War upon Banking and Industry.” in: H. B. Greven, ed. *The Netherlands and the World War. Studies in the War History of a Neutral*. (Economic and Social History of the World War, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Division of Economics and History) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928. IV:22.

²⁷ Porter. “Dutch Neutrality.” p. 135, 143. Baer. “The Anglo-German antagonism.” Appendix 5, p. 303.

²⁸ Much has been written about the Netherlands’ Overseas Trust (NOT), including: G. Keller. *N.O.T. The Netherlands Overseas Trust (Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij). Its Origin and Work*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917. Charlotte A. van Manen. *De Nederlandsche Overzee Trustmaatschappij. Middelpunt van het verkeer van onzijdig Nederland met het buitenland tijdens den wereldoorlog, 1914 - 1919*. The Hague: publisher unknown, 1935. A. Bell. *A history of The Blockade of Germany and of the countries associated with her in the great war. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 1914 - 1918*. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Officer, 1937. pp. 70 - 72. Smit. *Nederland in*

de Eerste Wereldoorlog. 2:80 – 97. C. Smit. *Tien studiën betreffende Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog*. Groningen: H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1975. pp. 80 – 106. Paul Moeyes. *Buiten Schot. Nederland tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog 1914 - 1918*. Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2001. pp. 187 – 198.

²⁹ For Dutch-American trade issues during the Great War, see: Marc Frey. “Deutsche Finanzinteressen an den Vereinigten Staaten und den Niederlanden im Ersten Weltkrieg.” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 53 (1994): 327 – 353. Marc Frey. “Die Niederlande als transatlantischer Vermittler, 1914 – 1920.” in: Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, Jürgen Heideking, eds. *Zwei Wege in die Moderne: Aspekte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1900 - 1918*. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1998. pp. 177 – 197.

³⁰ Anton Offer, “The Blockade of Germany and the Strategy of Starvation, 1914 - 1918.” in: Chickering et. al., eds. *Great War, Total War*. p. 173. Bell, *A history of The Blockade*. pp. 641 – 642. Vandenbosch, *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. p. 212.

³¹ Bell. *A history of The Blockade*. pp. 641 – 642. Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. p. 212.

³² The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Loudon, used the sentence “between the devil and the deep blue sea” to describe the Netherlands’ impossible trading position between Germany and Britain in a letter to the Dutch Minister in London, Reincke de Marees van Swinderen, 26 November 1915, in: C. Smit, ed. *Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandsche politiek van Nederland 1848 - 1919. Derde Periode 1899 - 1919. Vierde Deel 1914 - 1917*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. p. 482.

³³ Wim Klinkert. *Het Vaderland Verdedigd. Plannen en opvattingen over de verdediging van Nederland. 1874 – 1914*. The Hague: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, 1992. p. 400.

³⁴ C. van Tuinen. “De militaire handhaving van neutraliteit en gezag.” in: H. Brugmans, ed. *Nederland in den oorlogstijd. De geschiedenis van Nederland en van Nederlandsch-Indië tijdens den oorlog van 1914 tot 1919, voor zoover zij met dien oorlog verband houdt*. Amsterdam: Uitgevers-Maatschappij ‘Elsevier’, 1920. p. 68.

³⁵ “Declaration of neutrality of the Netherlands in the European war. August 5, 1914” in: Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. Appendix I, pp. 318 - 321.

³⁶ For more on the role played by soldiers in combatting smuggling, see: H. A. R. Smidt, “De bestrijding van de smokkelhandel door het leger tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog.” *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis* 15 (1993): 43 – 72.

³⁷ J. A. Eigeman. “De practijk der ‘Oorlogswet’ en de Gemeenten.” *Militair-Rechtelijk Tijdschrift* 15 (1919): 362.

³⁸ See footnote 7 above.

³⁹ Vandenbosch. *The Neutrality of the Netherlands*. p. 202. Porter. “Dutch Neutrality in Two World Wars.” p. 154. For a list of requisitioned ships see: J. H. Hoogendijk, ed. *De Nederlandsche Koopvaardij in den Oorlogstijd (1914 – 1918). Eigen Ervaringen van Gezagvoerders, Stuurheden en andere Opvarende*. Amsterdam: Von Holkema & Warendorf, 1930. pp. 495 – 497.

⁴⁰ Smit. *Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog*. 3:77.

⁴¹ Porter, “Dutch Neutrality” p. 225.